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How to Reconstruct Peirce’s Metaphysics of Agapasm, Rhetoric and the
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Helmut Pape
AUTHOR'S NOTE
I dedicate this paper to Jürgen Habermas. – I want to thank an anonymous referee for
his/her insightful criticsm, comments and suggestions and A. Dymek, Bamberg for
suggesting many corrections, additions and a new structure. – The third section
overlaps with “Compulsions, Forces and Assertions. Peirce on the Semiotics of
Rhetoric,” a lecture presented in Helsinki, April 22, 2014 at the conference “Applying
Peirce 2.”
“A road is where humans left their traces.” 
(Publilius Syrus, 1. century BC)
“Thus if the utterer says ‘Fine day!’ he does not
dream of any possibility of the interpreter’s
thinking of any mere desire for a fine day that a
Finn of the North Cape might have entertained on
April 19, 1776. He means, of course, to refer to the
actual weather, then and there, where he and the
interpreter are alike influenced by the fine
weather, have it near the surface of their
common consciousness.”
(Peirce, Charles Sanders, from: MS 318,1 1907, 
in: The Essential Peirce, Vol. 2 (1893-1913), 
Bloomington/Indianapolis 1998, p. 407; 
quoted in what follows as EP 1 or 2)
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Introduction: Reconstructing Aspects of Peirce’s
Thought
1 This  paper  does  not  give  an  interpretation  of  Peirce’s  philosophy.  It  takes  certain
features of his thought as points of departure so as to reconstruct them in terms of a
theory of sharing human life adapted from the German philosopher Rainer Marten. 
2 Section I shows that the metaphysics of evolutionary agape love rests on a rhetorical-
methodological argument. The agapastic principle that love is the highest principle of
evolution is reconstructed in terms of sharing relations and leads to a moral selection
principle.  This  move  implies  that  the  moral  cognitivist’s  interpretation2 of  Peirce’s
ethics  that  moral  development  depends  on  truth,  knowledge  and  inquiry  alone  is
incomplete in its account of the role inquiry plays in the moral and social development
of a person.
3 The core argument in Section II addresses in detail Peirce’s rhetorical and semiotical
analysis of assertion. It shows that in a pragmatically restricted sense sharing is crucial
for Peirce’s rhetorical analysis of assertion and that rhetorical arguments are present
everywhere and from the beginning of his work: it is by no means limited to Peirce’s
late, unfinished explicit project, a general rhetoric as general semiotics third discipline
– called “speculative,” “formal,” “universal” or simply “methodeutic” – for all types of
interpretation. The reconstruction shows that assertoric semiosis involves existential
relations of  humans sharing each other’s  life  and purposes.  The rhetorical  analysis
explains how interacting with assertions via close, existential sharing is successfully
achieved  only  when participating  in  situations  with  others  is  feasible.  That  is,  the
successful use of assertions depends on both, that experiences and purposes can be
shared.
4 In Section III, a concept of sharing is developed that supports a neo-Peircean concept of
democracy and allows a reconstruction of Peirce’s rhetoric and agapasm.  The crucial
step is that equal mutual person-to-person relations are shared that are basic for sign
use,  inquiry,  everyday social  interactions  and communication.  Since  agape-love  and
sympathy become efficient only in relational practices which guide the development of
purposes, they are – in a democratic society – necessary to extend person-to-person
relation to the political level. To see how sharing works the paper takes account of
some of Peirce’s anthropological and epistemic claims and the semiotics of the moral
and social development of the self.
5 Section IV  discusses  the  relation  between  economy  and  society,  and  democracy  in
particular,  which (cf.  Section I),  Peirce addressed in his  argument for agapasm.  It  is
argued that a genuine sharing economy provides an alternative to the market economy
and that the economy of sharing is a form of life that undergirds democratic social
groups and societies. Genuine sharing, by enabling equality in the access to economic,
moral and other opportunities allows homo sapiens to find its political realization in the
communal life of some form of democracy.
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I. Agapasm and Politics: Sentiment and the
Contradiction between Capitalism and Democracy
6 Today most political and social scientists agree that capitalism’s practice and ideology
of  individual  profit  and unlimited economic  growth is  socially  destructive.  Because
profit as an ideal that is supposed to give meaning to human life tends to destroy social
relations, morality and democratic institutions. Peirce had something similar in mind
when in  1893 he  attacked the  “philosophy of  greed.”3 His  topic  is  not  greed as  an
attitude of individuals but how in science and in western societies different sorts of
purposes are ranked. Because when a society understands greed as the paradigmatic
ideal  or  purpose  this  damages  the  moral  and  social  structure  of  human  relations.
Peirce’s 1893 prophecy that a complete break-down of the social structure in the US
and  other  western  societies  would  take  place  did  not  come  true  but  is  related  to
problems that are still with us:
The twentieth century, in its latter half, shall surely see the deluge-tempest burst
upon  the  social  order  –  to  clear  upon  a  world  as  deep  in  ruin  as  that  greed-
philosophy has long plunged it into guilt. (EP 1: 356; 6.292)
7 This gloomy prophecy rests on a rhetorical, methodological argument that attacks the
way in which the conclusions of political economy are generalized into a claim about
the order of all human purposes. The objection – which does not simply reject political
economy or deny that greed may have an economic function – is that from theories in
political economy no general theory evaluating all human purposes can be developed.
It argues that it is a methodological error to assume that all human purposes have to be
greed-like:
But  the  study  of  doctrines,  themselves  true,  will  often  temporarily  encourage
generalizations  extremely  false,  as  the  study  of  physics  has  encouraged
necessitarianism. What I say, then, is that the great attention paid to economical
questions during our century has induced an exaggeration of the beneficial effects
of greed and of the unfortunate results of  sentiment,  until  there has resulted a
philosophy which comes unwittingly to this, that greed is the great agent in the
elevation of the human race and in the evolution of the universe. (EP 1: 354; 6.292) 
8 In granting priority to greed, an order of human purposes is excluded that does justice
to naturally evolved purposes, which are based on emotions or “sentiment” between
persons. Even Peirce’s positive metaphysical claim, the principle of agapasm, rests on
this  methodological  argument,  because  it  implies  a  claim  about  the  selection  of
purposes. Peirce argues that if an order of human purposes does justice to “sentiment”
it  will  allow for a better social,  moral  and cultural  evolution of  human civilization.
Therefore the principle of agapasm that love as agape is the highest moral principle for
human evolution, is not just a strange metaphysical claim:
The movement of love is circular, at one and the same impulse projecting creations
into independency and drawing them into harmony. This seems complicated when
stated so; but it is fully summed up in the simple formula we call the Golden Rule.
This does not, of course, say, Do everything possible to gratify the egoistic impulses
of others, but it says, Sacrifice your own perfection to the perfectionment of your
neighbor. (EP 1: 352, 6.288)
9 Later on, Peirce is very specific about the persons who are the subjects of agape-love:
Love is not directed to abstractions but to persons; not to persons we do not know,
nor to numbers of people, but to our own dear ones, our family and neighbors. “Our
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neigbor,” we remember is one who we live near, not locally perhaps but in life and
feeling. (EP 1: 352, 6.288)
10 These two quotes show how metaphysical Peirce’s agapasm really is: it is a thesis which
gives priority to feelings insofar as they are “not locally” bound. That is to say, the
relation of sympathy has priority over anything that actually takes place between two
people. Interactively, here and now, shared life,  from which all  “not locally” bound
sympathetic  feelings  have  to  start,  contributes  nothing  to  the  emotion.  But  the
“movement of love” may be reconstructed as a “method of love” that takes sharing
another person’s life in a pragmatically serious way giving priority to relations actually
enacted by people. In this way, Peirce’s claim that society is based on “the sympathetic
connection  with  the  collective  people”  (6.307)  may  be  reconstructed  by  using  a
rhetorical argument: It is the actual, embodied sharing of both purposes and interaction
that makes an account of common purposes and their selection possible (cf. EP 1: 354;
6.292). Agapasm, reconstructed in this way, becomes a claim about sharing purposes and
actions interactively when choosing them. Indeed,  the topic of  this  principle is  the
practice of human social and moral relations in general. By invoking the golden rule, it
can be extended such that any two people, already sharing life, in choosing purposes
and courses of action should take into account
1) that the choices of each should depend on the consequences they have for the other
person sharing them, and 
2) that everyone’s choices should, if possible, aim at what is good (or bad) for every
other person who will share them.
11 Precisely  because  Peirce  talks  about  the  perfection  of  another  person  in  terms  of
“drawing  into  harmony,”  agape-love  can  be  reconstructed  as  a selection  principle:
purposes  are  developed  when  people  who  share  their  finite  life  develop  new,
cooperatively enacted purposes  with each other for  the betterment of  all  involved.
Agape-love, as a principle of selection for everyone involved in a shared relationship,
entails that each person will, in her/his choices, better the other’s life. This applies to
those purposes that can only be realized in society. Interpreted as a method, agape-love
thus chooses purposes which motivate shared actions and social  relations for some
common  good  that  may  govern  the  actual  historical  situation  of  living  together.
Reconstructed agapasm may be extended to provide an argument for how democracy is
related to sharing as a form of human life.
12 Peirce does not discuss “democracy” and related political issues in his published and
unpublished  writings  and  it  would  be  misleading  to  assume  that  Peirce’s  concepts
imply some political philosophy. Agape-love, pure and simple, stands for “sympathetic
connections,” based only on sharing “ideas” with humans who are close, but for “non-
local” reasons of sympathy. Even in those cases where a political meaning is implicit,
such a reading is not intended. Take e.g. Peirce’s notion of “agapastic or […] socialistic
ontology,”4 or  the  concepts  of  a  community  of  investigators  and  of  the  common
consciousness required for semiosis. The case of “socialistic ontology” shows that his
agapasm is  a  thesis  only  about  emotional  relations  between  humans  only.  These
concepts are part of his theory of inquiry, logic or semiotics.
13 Even when, in “Dmesis,” a short paper on criminal justice, Peirce addresses an issue of
political philosophy by discussing the status and range of justice in society, he argues
theologically and in terms of his metaphysics of agapasm: society is denied the right to
punish criminals, because although society may protect itself against criminal action, it
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is,  first  of  all,  obliged  to  help,  cure  and  resocialize  the  criminal  by  allowing  for
experiences which awake “the higher man” (Peirce) in her/him. Sharing is the practice
which, by giving much equal “sympathetic” weight to all humans related interactively
in a society or community, requires actual political and social processes in the choice of
purposes.  But  to  this  end,  only  a  democracy  provides  the  free  and  equal  space  of
development. Because only “if we can only enter into the spirit of Love, so as to see how
it acts and to put our trust in it, then we shall be able to bring about a new stage of
man’s development,”5 the execution of justice in a human society is justified. In this
case it builds on and develops the ability of agapastic sympathy between human beings.
That is, human social existence and morality depend on agapastic love in personal and
inter-personal relations. And this in turn implies that “every individual merging his
individuality in sympathy with his neighbors” (6.294) and that groups, institutions and
even  society  depend  on  some  sort  of  “sympathetic  connection.”6 But  this  already
implies a concept of sympathy that Peirce did not have: For him, only those attitudes
and relations that people have to each other because their sentiments tells them so are
morally and politically relevant – in his evolutionary-metaphysical approach. But at
least  Peirce  came  to  see  that  there  is  sort  of  a  democratic  “common  sense”  and
experience, due to culturally well-entrenched feelings of sympathetic emotions about
what is good and which might be shared by “all of us.”7 The “sympathetic connection”
approach to political issues describes a way of life which supports democracy only if
“sympathetic  connection”  is  reconstructed  in  terms  of  human  interaction  and
cooperation in situations of everyday life. That is, a strong concept of sharing would
subsume sympathetic connection as a special case of a close relation based on sharing. 
14 Peirce’s rhetorical, methodological argument against greed as a paradigmatic purpose
already  connects  love’s  power  as  a  method  of  purpose  selection  to  semiotics  and
rhetoric. But reconstructing semiotics and rhetoric in terms of actual sharing relations
will strengthen the connection and will imply a semiotic anthropology. This connection
between semiotic anthropology, sharing of purposes and rhetoric needs a theoretical
justification. Thus the next section will show that in the analysis of actual dialogical
interactions, using assertions, semiotics and rhetoric have to resort to sharing.
 
II. The Rhetoric of Assertion
15 The subject matter of Peirce’s comprehensive and anti-traditional account of a new
rhetoric is all interactive sign-use: all the conditions, methods, rules and strategies of
thought  or  interaction  which  generate  or  preserve  meaningful  interpretations.8
Pragmatism  is  thus  a  rhetorical  theory,  because  it  is  a  method  for  clarifying  an
assertion by translating and evaluating it according to the practical consequences that
follow from it.  Pragmatism deals with the systematic connection between the three
parts of semiotics, speculative grammar (semiotic in the usual, narrow sense), critic
(formal logic). Semiotics in a general sense, as a philosophical account of all sorts of
representation, is complemented by a pragmatic account of methods, conditions and
rules which in human communities allow us to develop practical consequences. 
16 For Peirce’s concept of persons and their relation it is important to keep in mind that in
formal logic and semiotics (sometimes called “speculative grammar”) no psychological
concepts are used to understand signs. The interpretant of a sign is not a person but
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another sign interpreting a first one, a requirement which is dropped for the third, last
part of semiotics, speculative rhetorics: 
In coming to Speculative Rhetoric, after the main conceptions of logic have been
well settled, there can be no serious objection to relaxing the severity of our rule of
excluding psychological matter, observations of how we think, and the like. The
regulation has served the end; why should it be allowed to hamper our endeavours
to make methodeutic practically useful. (2.107, 1902)
17 If  speculative  rhetoric  is  reconstructed  to  explain  the  interactive  conditions  of
democratic politics, it has to account for how people think and act, that is, it has to
study the different ways and conditions in which, in communities, people’s approaches,
interpretations and goals are shared. But for Peirce, engaging in a process of checking
the truth claim of an assertion is the basic dynamic case in which experiences, language
and purposes are shared. Therefore the rhetorical analysis of assertion is a study of the
interactive, performative elements of the dialogical process to which assertions belong
in order to show how sharing and communities are related.
18 This  is  because  to  assert  a  proposition  is  a  rhetorical  action:  both  believing  and
asserting a belief involves “an action that is related to our thought” (MS 599, 1902, & in
MS 499/499s, 1906). Yet logic and semiotics do not treat assertion as the fundamental
structural  model  of  semiotic  form;  their  focus  is  upon  argument  and  inferential
relation.  Rhetoric,  however,  studies  the  non-formal  conditions  of  interpretation  in
language communities that enable people to utter and interpret signs. And assertion is
the paradigmatic social act in using language in dialogue where at least two people
interact.  Therefore  the rules  and conditions that  rhetoric  looks  for  deal  with what
connects two  positions,  analogous  to  proposing  vs.  interpreting  an  argument.  Of
course, these positions are occupied by independently existing humans. But in using
signs, humans become either an utterer or an interpreter of a sign. Both the existential
independence and their systemic positions are rhetorical  features:  all  logical  forms,
semiotic processes and relations operate on and presuppose at least this two-position
model of  interaction and the existential  fact  that these positions are occupied.  The
dialogue is the paradigm of language in use, because “it is not merely a fact of human
Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should be
dialogic” (4.551, 1904). Peirce proposed various concepts for these dialogical positions,
e.g. the Artifex of Nature and the interpreter of nature, author and interpreter, speaker
and listener, graphist and grapheus, etc.9 
 
II.1. The Rhetoric of Attention and of Linguistic Experience in
Validating Assertions
19 Let  us  start  with  an  obvious  though  often  overlooked  characteristic  of  signs  and
assertion. The first effect of uttered tokens is that the token is grasped as such. The
utterance of an assertion is not just a physical effect on the interpreter: to perceive
something  as  a  sign  is  an  initial  semiotic  activity.  There  has  to  be  an  interactive
process, even if the token is only subconsciously attended to. At the level of subliminal
attention, the assertion has to be already effective in a noticeable way. Of course, there
is not much of a difference with the utterance of other signs. For example, Peirce points
out  that  assertion  and  question  share  the  same  rhetorical  property  of  arousing
attention: 
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An assertion has its modality, or measure of assurance, and a question generally
involves as a part of it an assertion of emphatically low modality. In addition to
that, it is intended to stimulate the hearer to make an answer. This is a rhetorical
feature  which  needs  no  special  grammatical  form.  If  in  wandering  about  the
country,  I  wish to  inquire  the  way to  town,  I  can perfectly  do so  by  assertion,
without drawing upon the interrogative form of syntax. Thus I may say, “This road
leads,  perhaps,  to  the city.  I  wish to  know what  you think about  it.”  The most
suitable way of expressing a question would, from a logical point of view, seem to
be by an interjection: “This road leads, perhaps, to the city, eh?” (4.57, 1893) 
20 This is  a  rhetorical  argument in two respects:  under some circumstance a question
might do a better job of information-gathering than an assertion. However, the other
task performed is the capturing and focusing of attention of the hearer/interpreter.
One assumption of a rhetorical account of assertion is that in order to understand how
an  assertion  functions  semiotically,  rhetorical  evidence  is  decisive  in  enabling  the
appropriate  interpretative  response  on  the  part  of  the  listener.  Peirce’s  term  to
describe  rhetorically  effective  features  of  signs  (in  written  texts,  dialogues)  is
“rhetorical evidence.” Rhetorical evidence covers the arousal of a person’s perceptual
attention when he or she perceives that some e.g. acoustical or visual event is a sign. In
the case of an acoustic utterance of a sentence, some perceptual and basic orientation
processes will become rhetorical evidence. Because “we can directly observe what is
familiar  to  our  experience  of  assertions  and  seems  to  be  inseparable  from  them”
(2.333, 1896, MS 787). Let us take as an example an utterance where someone sees a
horse in the distance and, turning to the hearer, says:
(1) “There is a brown horse over there.” 
21 To grasp that there is a sign you have to understand the uttered token and what it
might be about.  In terms of Peirce’s semiotics,  we are able to understand what the
sign’s possible object, i.e. its “immediate object,” might be like. This may take place
subliminally and depends on a cognitive process that introduces the unifying idea of
some single object of sorts. This immediate object remains “unexpressed by the sign”
(MS 318) but its activation allows us to react to and select features of the actual or
possible situations. This entails a) the interpreter’s ability to understand the assertion
(1) as the singling out of something as a brown horsey object; b) the “we” in Peirce’s
thesis that “we can directly observe what is familiar” implies some “direct observation”
without  implying  that  this  depends  on  subjective  observation  only.  That  which  is
inseparably  linked  to  assertion  in  the  rhetorical  evidence  depends  on  a  relational
approach,  which  is  composed  of  actual,  i.e.  performatively  shared  modes  of
comprehension and interpretation. A rhetorical account of assertion must explain its
semantic  and  epistemic  role:  there  are  familiar,  iconically  and  indexically  guided
perceptual  reactions  in  semiotic  situations  which  allow  for  a  direct,  shared
understanding  and access  to  situations  where  linguistic  assertions  can  be  checked.
Such  a  concept  of  direct,  non-linguistic  access  combined  with  a  division  of  labor
between language and shared non-linguistic epistemic activities is the starting point of
rhetorical analysis:
It is requisite then, in order to show what we are talking or writing about, to put
the hearer’s or reader’s mind into real, active connection with the concatenation of
experience  or  of  fiction  with  which  we are  dealing,  and,  further,  to  draw  his
attention  to,  and  identify,  a  certain  number  of  particular  points  in  such
concatenation. (3.419, 1896)
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22 No “sympathetic connetion” or “sentiment” is needed: what constitutes a “connection”
to  experience  for  those  involved  in  a  dialogue  opened  by  an  assertion  are  both
cognitive features and direct situational observations that can be shared in person-to-
person relations and contribute to the use of assertions. The observation of the sign
itself10 is the starting point: the act of uttering a proposition assertively lets the listener
grasp  those  relations  that  subsist  between  people,  objects,  circumstances  in  the
situation in which it is used and to which it refers. It prompts the interpreter to access
the observation by grasping,  sometimes only  imaginatively, situations  in  which the
assertion might be validated.
 
II.2. Sharing the Speaker’s Compelling Experience
“[…] an act of assertion supposes that, a
proposition being formulated, a person performs
an act which renders him liable to the penalties
of the social law (or, at any rate, those of the
moral law) in case it should not be true, unless he
has a definite and sufficient excuse […]” 
(2.315, 1903)
“Unsere Rede erhält durch unsre 
übrigen Handlungen ihren Sinn.”11 
(Ludwig Wittgenstein, “Über Gewissheit,” 
Frankfurt 1970, § 228, S. 63)
23 Stand-alone  assertions  do  not  belong to  an  argument.  Sometimes  they  are  used as
commands  to  accept  a  certain  proposition  because  somebody  –  an  authority,  a
manager, a celebrity – says so. But in this case the content whose truth the assertion
claims is not checked. Of course, there are always relations and actions which both the
speaker and interpreter have to engage in to interact by means of assertions. Both have
to  do  something  and  have  to  grasp  situational  relations  to  make  and  interpret  an
assertion  successfully.  The  rhetoric  of  assertion  shows  that  only  due  to  rhetorical
evidence do both utterer and interpreter accept that the truth of the assertion can be
understood and checked.  Meaningful  propositions are therefore to  be expressed by
assertions  referring  to  some  situation  where  the  interpreter  may  perform  the
experience that may validate the assertion:
Thus every kind of proposition is either meaningless or has a real Secondness as its
object.  This  is  a  fact  that  every reader of  philosophy should constantly  bear  in
mind, translating every abstractly expressed proposition into its precise meaning in
reference to an individual experience. (2.315, 1903)
24 That is to say, a proposition is meaningful, if it can be checked in a situation in which
some evidence for it is accessible for some interpreter too. There is an experience of an
objective  relation  which  compels  the  speaker  to  make  the  assertion.  This  is  the
accessible “individual experience” supplying rhetorical evidence for the assertion. The
speaker,  by  the  utterance  of  the  assertion,  wants  to  pass  on  this  experiential
compulsion. Because it is shared compelling evidence – “yes, I can see the brown horse
over there” – that induces someone to accept p. It is not a logically necessary move,
even if there is situational evidence shared and relevant for an assertion.
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25 The use of rhetorical evidence in the situation that the author and the interpreter of an
assertion find themselves  in  is  analogous  to  an argument:  the  interpreter  is  able  to
interpret the assertion correctly if both share the same evidence and he or she accepts
the premises as well as the move from them to the assertion. To assert a proposition is
a move subject to rhetorical rules embodied in dialogical practice. Becoming convinced
in  the  first  place  presupposes  that  in  a  dialogue  the  partners  accept  that  what  is
commonly  shared  determines  an  assertion’s  validity  and  truth.  Rhetoric,  in  asking
“what conditions a sign must conform to,  in order to be pertinent to the purpose”
(NEM IV: 62) and in explaining the practice of inquiry and interpretation, has to study
the structure of shared purposes. Surely, all signs, in aiming to represent some object,
have a teleological structure and, in science, truth is the teleos of the community of
investigators. Because “a science […] is a deliberate course of inquiry. As such, it  is
animated by a purpose.” (MS 1343, 00019). For Peirce, science is a way of life, requiring
common purposes.  In  1902,  in  MS 1343  on the  classification of  the  sciences,  Peirce
describes science as a “mode of life that seeks cooperation” (0009). Consequently, the
“principles  of  science”  have  a  teleological  basis  in  purposes  that  also  govern close
cooperation.  In  the case  of  rhetoric  this  means that  every use of  signs in  dialogue
(particularly the use of assertions) tacitly assumes that the utterance by its author and
its interpretation by its hearer/reader share a purpose that guides their cooperation in
accepting its interpretation. 
26 By using a token of some specific system of signs, e.g. the German language, the author
provides evidence that he or she belongs to a specific community of cooperative sign-
use: there is a tacit social identification involved in it. One of the cooperative purposes
of assertions in science and everyday discourse is the well-known purpose of finding
out whether the asserted fact is true or is interesting. But for interpretations of
assertions  to  be  rhetorically  adequate  and rational  the  interpreter  has  to  agree  or
disagree relative to compulsions shared by both the author and interpreter. In 1896, in
MS 787, Peirce proposes an analysis of assertion in rhetorical and grammatical terms: 
The assertion consists in the furnishing of evidence by the speaker to the listener
that the speaker believes something, that is, finds a certain idea to be definitively
compulsory on a certain occasion. There ought, therefore, to be three parts in every
assertion, a sign of the occasion of the compulsion, a sign of the enforced idea, and
a sign evidential of the compulsion affecting the speaker in so far as he identifies
himself with the scientific intelligence. (2.336)
27 The three aspects of the assertion’s force together make up its evidential effect. When
people interpret an assertion as true, they do so for the following reasons:
(1) Because of the subject term they are able to connect it to some compulsory situation
(Peirce: occasion12); 
(2) because of the predicate term they understand that there is some shared qualitative
content (Peirce: idea) applicable to this same situation;
and 
(3) because the interpreter as well as the speaker recognize that there is “scientific”
evidential relevance in the asserted connection between subject and predicate.
28 (1) and (2) describe how the asserted predicative content is tied to compelling relations
the  interpreter  is  able  to  access,  e.g.  features  of  some  perceptual  situation.  These
compelling  relations  are  two-place  and  they  subsist  only  if  the  relata  are  actually
present. They are what Peirce calls “existential relations.” Requiring their presence or
accessibility for a correct interpretation of an assertion decides whether the validation
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of assertions will work or not. Because it connects contingent features of the situation
of utterance of the assertion – to which the token used belongs – with those cognitive,
practical and experiential processes the interpreter has to go through to understand
why some situation is represented in the assertion as compelling: 
Because compulsion is essentially hic et nunc, the occasion of the compulsion can
only be represented to the listener by compelling him to have experience of that
same occasion. Hence it is requisite that there should be a kind of sign which shall
act  dynamically  upon the hearer’s  attention and direct  it  to  a  special  object  or
occasion. Such a sign I call an Index. It is true that there may, instead of a simple
sign of this kind, be a precept describing how the listener is to act in order to gain
the occasion of experience to which the assertion relates. But since this precept
tells him how he is to act, and since acting and being acted on are one and the same,
and thus  action is  also  hic  et  nunc,  the  precept  must  itself  employ an Index or
Indices. That to which the index directs attention may be called the subject of the
assertion. (2.336)
29 The  interpretation  of  the  utterance  creates  the  sameness  of  situated,  “occasioned”
experience and is produced by sign-relative mental actions.13 This gives the assertion
the status of an offer or challenge: an assertion directs, invites the interpreter to enter
into experiential contact with some relevant compelling occasion which, according to
rhetorical evidence conveyed by the assertion, is decisive to verifying its validity. On
the one hand an assertion is an invitation, suggestion or proposal by the author for an
interpreter to share what is  asserted as objective and true.  The speaker invites the
listener (interpreter) to produce an interpretation, by using his or her own practical
and  cognitive  activities  to  verify  its  validity.  Of  course,  assertions,  just  like  other
suggestions, can be refused or ignored: they are fragile and do not force anybody. But if
an assertion is to be evaluated adequately, the interpreter has to accept it at least as a
proposal. Because only in this case can the truth claim of the assertion be accessed: the
interpreter has to experience the same compulsion that led the author to formulate the
assertion. 
30 The  third  condition  involves  a  strong,  metaphysical  claim:  there  has  to  be  some
“evidence” that the speaker made and the interpreter has to acknowledge the assertion
because  he  or  she  identifies  with  “scientific  intelligence.”  What  is  at  stake  here  is
Peirce’s account of truth as the object of an (with respect to time and all intelligent
beings) unlimited community of inquiry. But if it is restricted to an actual community
in which sharing relations between humans subsist during their life times, a different
explanation emerges: to verify the truth of an assertion in a reliable way is open for
everybody, because an open range of shared accessibility of the experience supporting
the validity of the assertion is to be granted. Only those assertions can be true which
rely on experiences that can be accessed by anybody who is willing and able to fulfil the
necessary conditions for grasping and judging them. This is the normative meaning of
“scientific intelligence,” which prevents that e.g. some specific group of people would
be  arbitrarily  excluded  from  sharing  an  asserted  experience  and  interpreting  an
assertion. All those people/beings able to gain the epistemic, knowledge-based access
to relevant experience may join in: the community of scientific intelligence is open for
all; it only requires the willingness and ability to correct reactions, beliefs and attitudes
through experience. But all these possible corrections of asserted beliefs require the
sharing of experience as a starting point for cooperation within a community. This is
Peirce’s  claim  in  1902:  “But  science  being  essentially  a  mode  of  life  that  seeks
cooperation, the unit science must, apparently, be fit to be pursued by a number of
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inquirers.” (MS 1343, p. 0009, Classification of the Sciences). Experience will count as
rhetorical  evidence for an assertion only if  it  is  at  least potentially accessible for a
community of inquirers. Nobody asserting a proposition may claim that it is true only
relative to his/her individual experience/imagination and cannot be shared by others.
Together, the three requirements describe how humans living contemporaneously are
connected by the strategic rhetorical interplay of assertoric dialogues: In uttering an
assertion,  the  speaker/author  implicitly  assures  all  listeners/readers  that  the
circumstances of the evidence validating the assertion are accessible in the time of
their life as situations in which they have occasion sharing experiences relevant for
understanding the assertion.
31 The  third  condition  of  2.336,  the  identification  with  every  scientific  intelligence,
demands  that  we  have  trust  in  the  experiential  accessibility  of  assertions.  If  we
combine this  condition of  assertions with the requirement of  sharing of  situational
compulsions, we arrive at two conditions:
i. an assertion should capture the attention of the interpreter who will have to follow it
as  a  suggestion  that  there  really  is  something  worthwhile14 which  the  assertion
addressed to him/her will help him/her to find out;
ii. it requires a move or cognitive activity guided by the uttered assertion15 because of
this interaction.  It captures the attention of the interpreter, stimulating him/her to
imagine, perceive and act appropriately. 
32 The subject matter of rhetoric is all the rules, strategies, habits or moves taking place
between people engaged with each other, sharing a common interest, goal or purpose.
Rhetorically speaking checking what an assertion claims depends on the cooperation of
people engaged in an interpretative process bound to the accessibility of experiences
that can be shared.
 
II.3. From Common Experience to Rhetorical Evidence
33 Peirce argues as an anti-psychological externalist: we do not have to share the same 
material quality of feeling or sensation to share some experience. In rhetorical analysis,
qualities of feeling have an interactional, strategic function. That is to say, a person
engaged in a dialogue may appeal to or look for a relational value in reaction to some
utterance.  It  is shared  rhetorical  evidence  that  provides  the  basis  even  for  formal
arguments: 
For  the  deductions,  or  quasi-predictions,  from  theory  having  been  made,  it  is
requisite to turn to the rhetorical evidence and see whether or not they are verified
by observation. If we find them to be so, not only does the analysis of assertion gain
evidence of being completely rounded, but the theory of truth is rendered more
probable. (2.333, 1896, MS 787)
34 Experiential evidence becomes rhetorical evidence only if it can be accessed and used
by other sign-users in a community to verify whether the assertion is true or not. This
may  be  called  Peirce’s  Common  Sense-Account  of  rhetorical  evidence:  common,
shareable and familiar experiences are suitable as  rhetorical  evidence,  allowing the
interpreter to grasp assertions directly. Invoking common, shareable, but unexpressed
experience  is  traditionally  called  “rhetorical  argumentation.”  By  relying  on  a
suppressed premise it is classified as an incomplete argument or enthymene. Peirce
does  not  accept  this  rejection  of  rhetorical  argumentation.  For  him,  speculative
rhetoric  may  give  an  account  of  the  conditions  of  interpretability  that  consists  in
Sharing and the Democratic Form of Human Life
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XII-2 | 2020
11
rhetorical arguments invoking the conditions,  rules for common, shared experience
and relations which cannot be expressed as premises. For example, when the dialogical
participants in the situation of the utterance of an assertion are already present in a
situation to which the assertion refers, this implicit condition cannot be made explicit.
But strategic rules of  interaction are able capture these conditions:  they assume in
various ways how and when for everybody taking part in a dialogue some evidential
access  to  relevant  experiences  is  required to  understand and validate  assertions.  A
rhetorical argumentation will make explicit these contingent possibilities from which
specific rhetorical evidence might be accessed.16 Whereas deductive inference draws
necessary consequences from premises, arguing from rhetorical evidence concerns the
range and scope of  the  dialogical  process  embodying the  argument.  It  invokes  e.g.
interactional moves based on the possible observational, motor-sensory or epistemic
activity of the interpreter.
 
II.4. The Rhetorical Account of Assertion: Conclusions
35 Propositions  in  arguments  and  assertions  in  dialogues  serve  an  analogous  logical
function. When Peirce characterizes propositions as truncated arguments or inferential
processes, this describes assertions too. Because characteristic of assertions is that “a
proposition is nothing more nor less than an argumentation whose propositions have
had their assertiveness removed, just as a term is a proposition whose subjects have
had  their  denotative  force  removed”  (2.356,  1896).  When  viewed  rhetorically,
individual,  isolated  assertions  are  truncated  dialogues.  Only  a  response  to  them  is
missing. A rhetorical analysis of signs (assertions, concepts, incomplete conversations)
will  explain them in terms of  models  for  a  successful  strategy of  argumentative or
interactional exchange. These models describe how some signs might be used as moves
initiating and guiding successful dialogues or other ways of cooperation. The rhetorical
power  of  signs  is  explained  by  describing  how  they  are  uttered  by  someone  and
perceived as  being uttered by  someone who wants  someone else  to  react  to  them,
accept and validate them, given some shared purpose. The sequence of perceptions and
actions with signs and their interpretation will in these interactional moves function
analogously to the dialogical structure of an argument.
36 Therefore one conclusion is that just as a proposition is related to and is interpreted in
an inferential process, an assertion is a semiotic device related to and interpreted in a
dialogue that needs both a purpose which author and interpreter in the dialogue share
and a community to which the two parties are related. This is how they handle the
evidence for the assertion they share.
 
III. Sharing: The Connection between Semiotics and
Moral Anthropology 
37 In the last two decades in biology, anthropology, psychology and the social sciences a
new  paradigm  for  explaining  the  uniqueness  of  humans  and  their  societies  has
emerged that argues that the enormous evolutionary success of human beings is due to
the power of the complex social relations homo sapiens sapiens is able to build up to each
other.17 The crucial hypothesis of this paper is that, for humans, sharing each other’s
life is  an unavoidable element for other more complex social,  cultural  and political
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relations, and acts as their necessary starting- and end-point. For this reason, sharing
can  also  be  called  “existential”:  it  is  the  only  existential  relation,  created  at  a
contingent time and place in which one human may engage with another human, both
of them preconsciously experiencing each other as human beings. Relations of sharing
between humans are fundamental because the equality of being human is established
in a preconscious, purely interactive way. Because in sharing, humans mutually grasp
and react to each other as being human. For this, no explicit recognition, no norms of
reciprocal actions e.g. working for pay or exchanging gifts of equal value (cf. section IV)
are necessary.  That is  to say,  sharing is  the most basic humanly human relation: it
enables human life to go on under the most unlikely circumstances; it operates without
requiring that other,  more demanding relations such as shared intentions or moral
relations such as altruism are already in place. This is the reason why sharing may be
used  to  reconstruct  sympathy  and  agape-love  in  terms  of  fundamental  relations  of
sharing.
38 The  concept  of  sharing  captures  a  pragmatic  interactional  and  contingent  relation
between humans developing purposes in contingent moment of the life they share as
comtemporaries.  The  German  philosopher  Rainer  Marten’s  concept  of  sharing  one
another’s life, “Lebensteilung,” describes what takes place in those finite moments of
close mutual, interactive exchange between humans already thereby recognizing each
other in their present position in each other’s life. Lebensteilung ties human life and
abilities to the contingent mutually cognitive, positional, actively produced relations of
close person-to-person interactions. Lebensteilung is altogether practical, performative:
it  consists  in  close  mutually  grasped  events  of  contact  performed by  touch,  looks,
words, noises and present positions taken. 
39 It is surely a simple fact that it takes a man and a woman to produce a baby and that
this baby will flourish and become a socially competent human being only by living in
close contact not only with his/her parents but with other people, whether family or
not.18 This  highlights  the  way  in  which  all  those  momentary  experiences  between
humans build up a sequence of shared events: they are so many opportunities, cases of
“kairos,” in which the child and its parents are part of finite relations of contact, of
touch and looks. We discover our own human self by living these moments as shared: I
am human, just like those others I am in contact with. These face-to-face, skin-to-skin
interactional  co-presences  are  necessary  to  allow  the  self  to  grasp  his/her  own
position.19 This  universally  contingent  feature  of  being  human  is  irreducible  to
something that happens to isolated individuals.20
40 Marten’s account of sharing one’s life and the notion of token-indexicality in Peirce’s
semiotics (in the rhetorical analysis of assertion in Section II) both exemplify the event-
bound practice of shared existence. Peirce argues time and again (cf. the 2nd motto of
this  paper)  that  we  can  only  communicate  by  taking  present  but  unexpressed
commonly  shared  relations  for  granted.  The  co-presence  of  what  is  said  and  the
moment  in  which  it  is  said  can  never  completely  be  turned  into  something  said
explicitly. Analogously, Marten points out that sharing one’s life is in place well before
– independently of, but enabling of – consciousness and language and the development
of moral abilities.
41 Of course, sharing the life of somebody is what happens between humans everyday,
constantly, for all those who are alive at the same time and are in contact with one
another. It happens unnoticed, unattended: it does not require thought, intentions or
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actions. Sharing takes place immediately as soon as two people attend to and grasp one
another as humans, e.g. by looking, touching each other. Sharing another human’s life,
has already been performed as soon as signs are used, perceived and interpreted. It is
what has taken place “then and there, where she/he [the author] and the interpreter
are alike influenced” and may result in what Peirce calls “common consciousness” (MS
318,  1905).  Sharing  involves  simply  a  first  cognitive  grasp,  the  understanding  and
ongoing  development  of  signs  as  token-entities  and  is  true  for  any  semiotic  move,
regardless of whether it is the mere grasping of a token of a linguistic sign, gesture or
natural sign. 
42 Section II  showed how the  rhetorical  dynamics  of  assertion depends  on the  shared
experience of using signs. The only place where for Peirce genuine sharing takes place
and on which the interpretation of assertion depends are the relations which indexical
tokens signify: 
An index has nothing to do with meanings; it has to bring the hearer to share the
experience of the speaker by showing what he is talking about. The words this and 
that are indicative words.  They apply to different things every time they occur.
(4.56)
43 Persons only “share” via an indexical token that activates what they have access to. For
Peirce,  however,  this  sharing is  not connected with the agape driven and perfected
development of shared purposes. One reason for this is Peirce’s metaphysical, abstract
concept of persons, selves and sympathy. As shown in Section I, there is no place for
existential sharing, because only agape’s sympathetic connection between persons and
not existential sharing constitutes agapastic sympathy. This neglect of an account of
existential sharing is the result of, among other factors, an abstract, metaphysically
generalized concept  of  a  person.  Peirce’s  account  of  a  person is,  on the  one hand,
reasonable  in  refusing  individualism.  It  implies  a  sort  of  Anti-Nietzeschean  view,
stressing the limits of the powers and possibilities of the individual. Clearly, a person is
not an individual in the logical sense.21 But on the other hand, the person, the self via
agape sympathy, is detached from the effects of existential sharing in space and time by
a complex law-and-habit-generated sign process which is guided by agape sympathy.
The  anthropological  thesis  that  “man  is  a  sign,”  from  around  1868,  understands
humans  as  law-like,  habit-  and  interpretation-governed  entities  developing  in
communities of interpretation to which they belong. Later on, between 1892 and 1905,
this thesis is supplemented by a thesis about the dialogical, rhetorical nature of human
personality and understands social groups or even societies as persons: 
Two things here are all-important to assure oneself of and to remember. The first is
that a person is not absolutely an individual. His thoughts are what he is “saying to
himself,” that is, is saying to that other self that is just coming into life in the flow
of time. When one reasons, it is that critical self that one is trying to persuade; and
all  thought  whatsoever  is  a  sign,  and is  mostly  of  the  nature  of  language.  The
second thing to remember is that the man’s circle of society (however widely or
narrowly this phrase may be understood), is a sort of loosely compacted person, in
some respects of higher rank than the person of an individual organism. (5.421,
1905)
44 Preconscious  comprehensions  are  crucial  for  Peirce’s  semiotics  and  his  agapasm.
Uttering and perceiving the sign’s material, like feeling agapastic sympathy take their
start from what is performed and experienced preconsciously. In fact, it is a distinctive
feature of Peirce’s semiotics that all indexical signs have to be shared by preconscious
perceptual reactions (cf. 4.56), which are triggered by the contingent material quality
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of the sign itself, by its being a specific quali- and sin-sign, a token of some type. Peirce’s
semiotics  is  the  first  account  that  integrates  systematically  the  contingency  of
preconscious perceptive reactions to the sign’s  material  existence.  This approach is
backed up by his experimental  findings  in  the psychology of  perception:  In  “Small
Differences  of  Sensation,”22 he  and  J. Jastrow  proved  that  judgments  about  pre-
conscious  perception  of  weight  differences  are  reliable  to  a  statistically  highly
significant  degree.  Later  on,  in  a  number  of  other  papers,  e.g.  “Telepathy  and
Pereption”  (MS  881,  1903),  he  builds  on  these  results  and  argues  that in  practical
matters,  humans  rely,  without  knowing  it,  on  preconscious  perceptions  in
understanding their surroundings. But what Peirce did not take into account is that
pre-conscious perceptions are necessary for becoming and staying alive as a human
being.  And  only  sharing  captures  for  the  semiotics  of  assertive,  indexical
communication  the  preconscious  contact  relations  important  for  deciding  what
relations and facts are present.  This neglect has ethical  and political  consequences,
because existential relations between people are left out, as if sharing is no part of the
account.
 
III.1. Becoming Oneself by Being Related to Others
45 According to Peirce’s externalism23 what happens in the mind and how it develops is
best explained by invoking external facts. But his agapasm has no place for external
facts about the existential relation of human to other humans. Humans are genetically
disposed to learn intuitively and performatively to share ways to agree, to cooperate24
and  to  simulate  each  other.  These  shared  ways  are  habits  of  perception,  reaction,
action and thought. Most of these are multi-form, relational features, including non-
verbal habits of spontaneous reactions, looks, gestures, linguistic performances and are
to be experienced in close person-to-person exchanges. By acquiring habits in this way,
including the “fortuitous variations of our actions” (6.86), human beings develop a self,
understanding itself as positioned in relation to other humans. That is, the self and the
other  share  rules  and  strategies.  They  take  up  and  vary  what  is  performed  and
embodied in the human neighborhood as their point of departure. The development of
the self is never complete: the tie to interaction at the very moment of encounter with
other people and the “fortuitous variations of our actions” always remains effective. 
46 Peirce’s notion of semiotic autonomy of a person and his externalism reconstructed in
terms of sharing makes it possible that the self develops moral abilities by grasping its
position in close relations to others.  This involves the ability to develop out of  the
sharing  relations  one  has  lived  through  by  cognitive  layers  of  self-control,  tied  to
sequences of interactions. That is to say, self-control25 of thought and habits of action is
an  ability  from  which  self-controlled  moral  habits  emerge  and  moral  rules  and
principles arise: 
When a man trains himself, thus controlling control, he must have some moral rule
in view, however special and irrational it may be. But next he may undertake to
improve this rule; that is, to exercise a control over his control of control. To do
this he must have in view something higher than an irrational rule. He must have
some sort of moral principle. (5.533, 1905)
47 Because  of  the  experience  of  relations  to  other  selves  the  logical  self  becomes
autonomous  and capable  of  moral  self-control  and relating  freely,  with  “subjective
generality” (MS 330, 1906), to other people. Peirce’s account of the self may thus be
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reconstructed as a kind of moral self-control that is embodied in and is relative to the
individual’s position in a community of person-to-person interactions.26 This practical
participation  in  habits  is  the  sort  of  interaction  which  can  be  rational  and well-
reasoned as well as spontaneous and without any reasoning involved. However, in both
cases it  requires that one has experienced situational sharing. Peirce’s thesis that a
person is a complex, developing teleological system implies that living as a person is
possible only if he or she is free to develop or choose ideals, values or ends. Because in
the  case  of  personality  this  teleology  is  more  than  a mere  purposive  pursuit  of  a
predeterminate end; it is a developmental teleology. “[…] Were the ends of a person
already explicit, there would be no room for development, for growth, for life.” (6.156f,
1892). 
48 But there would be no possibility for humans to develop their life together without
developing common purposes.  The two claims,  “man is  a sign having purposes and
experiences in common with each other” and “man is a developing system of purposes”
complement each other: human individuals may each develop their own purposes and
values and at the same time do so in a way that includes the other. In education and in
daily life the cultural traditions of the society one lives in, the social environment in
which one is born and raised, convey values. If individuals are able to live a human life
in close contact with others, to develop new, different ends and purposes, humans use
close interactional relations to adapt and transform their ends. For this reason, the
developmental teleology is a self- and other-developmental process at the same time.
Reflective  self-control’s  interpretation  of  purposes  and  values  may,  for  example,
dialogically  establish  comparative  relations  between  different  ends  and  help  to
establish an evaluative relation to the purposes of others. This is the way to develop
ends,  in  life’s  finite  moments,  by  actively  sharing  life  with  other  people  in  close
encounters.
 
IV. Developing Means and Ends: The Rhetoric of
Sharing Life in a Democracy
“[…] the task of democracy is forever that of
creation of a freer and more humane experience
in which all share and to which all contribute.” 
(Dewey 1936: 230)
49 The rhetorical account of the conditions for the interpretation of assertions turned out
to rest on a shared experiential access to the situation, to the topic of communication,
to  the  people  addressed  and  to  the  possible  communities  one  wants  to  belong  to.
Furthermore, Section I reconstructed agape-love as a selective strategy that picks out
purposes that are sympathetically shared in a common development of individual life
and interactions.  To work for humans in the finite time of their life,  sharing-based
processes of exchange, communication and cooperation are needed so that democratic
participation  in  politics  and  social  life  may  develop  in  practice.  Rainer  Marten’s
conception of  shared human existence shows how democracy may be supported by
practical, close person-to-person interactions which allows humans to develop trusting
and conscientious relations to other persons. Marten’s approach is pragmatic: it is the
actual  finite  and  fortuitous  relations  between  persons  in  the  existential  setting  of
sharing on which the flourishing of human life in a democracy depends. Because it is in
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terms of the success of direct, close contact (e.g. eye to eye) and dialogues that Marten’s
“humanly human” theory of the self understands moral and political processes. And it
can in turn give us an account of conscience that may integrate Peirce’s account of it as
a self-critical way of dealing with sentiment’s moral intuitions. This account applies to
humans encountering, cooperating and confronting each other in the finite moments
of their life. Because relations of sharing, e.g. transferring authority, power and trust to
politicians in parliament and in government, are semiotically extended ways of sharing
their  life  and  constitute  the  interpersonal  exchanges  for  sharing  in  a  democratic
political system.27
50 On  the  other  hand,  Peirce’s  agape-love  reconstructed  as  sharing  and  his  rhetorical
approach  to  assertoric  interaction  supports  a  pragmatic  moral  anthropology.  A
rhetoric of democratic processes integrates the practical equality of positions for these
person-to-person  relations  into  the  social  and  political  conditions  for  developing
democracy,  because  the  rhetoric  of  assertion  already  requires  equal  access  and
possibilities for everybody concerned. This equality in the open development of life and
purposes is a condition that can only be realized in a democracy: every individual’s
moral  and  political  beliefs,  developing  aims,  purposes  and  political  strategies  are
allowed for, if they can be shared. Because only in a democracy are all forms of active
participation in the development of community life ultimately possible. This equality of
interaction and development in the form of daily life and in politics can be grounded in
the reconstruction of Peirce’s speculative rhetoric of assertion, if it is understood as
involving  equal  sharing  as  a  basis  from  which  participatory,  cooperative  political
practice  develops.  Because,  as  has  been  shown,  already  the  rhetorical  practice  of
assertion,  in  requiring  the  identification  of  the  individual  with  a  community  of
“scientific  intelligence,”  can  be  boiled  down  to  requiring  an  equality  in  sharing
commonly accessible experiences. 
 
IV.1. The Economy of Sharing: Democracy and Living Together
51 Today in many western societies,  e.g.  in Germany, some new economic practices of
sharing are developing. The so-called “tables” (Tafel) provide free food, clothes, etc.
from super-markets and from production facilities for people in need. This distributing
of goods is, e.g. regulated by certain legal conditions: You have to prove that you are a
low-income person to receive them. “Table-sharing” is neither a practice of market-
economy nor of gift economy, nor does it come close to the equality of an economic
variant of existential sharing between humans. For existential sharing to take place it
would be enough for somebody to show up, for others to understand that he or she is
present to receive all the food, clothes and other necessities for his or her life.
52 Today in almost all human societies on earth, market or state capitalism excludes an
economy  of  sharing  and  exploits  humans  and  natural  resources.  But  the  present
situation  is  a  historical,  contingent  one.  It  will  likely  end  soon  because of  climate
change, gross economic inequalities, depletion of natural resources and the extinction
of millions of natural species will destroy the material conditions of world capitalism’s
unlimited  growth.  And  the  alternative  –  existential  economic  sharing  –  has  been
practiced all through the ages. The anthropologist Thomas Widlok,28 arguing on the
basis  of  studies in  Africa  and  South-America,  has  shown  that  in  some  cases  the
economy  of  existential  sharing  is  still  alive:  there  are  hunter-gatherer  societies
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interacting in relations of sharing,  based on humans beings existentially related on
equal terms. Through true sharing people are able to distribute goods, resources and
work  without  invoking  a  system  of  market  or  gift  exchange.  Widlok  develops  his
argument  both  theoretically  and  empirically  from  field  studies  of  these  hunter-
gatherer-societies. In fact he performed some of these field studies himself. He shows
that what is at stake in existential sharing with somebody is the enacting of an equality
of self with others. The physical presence of a person alone is not decisive by itself: the
other person has to be perceived and it has to be recognized that his or her presence is
an active and persistent  one,  as  a  human being and only then does it  lead,  e.g.  to
sharing of food. Widlok provides photographic evidence for food sharing that comes to
pass because a person “hangs around waiting for a share” of a meal. He argues that co-
presence acts as a sign, in this very moment of the other’s cooking a meal,  so that
people  understand  each  other  as  part  of  each  other’s  life.  Widlok  points  out  that
“physical and temporal co-presence are not enough, it is practical presence that needs
to be established. Practical presence is presence that is recognized by both parties in
the encounter.” (Ibid.: 72).
53 Therefore in sharing economies the experiential grasp and status of human beings for
each other is that they are alive and existentially related. Widlok shows that sharing
relations are forms of direct, close and equal participation. Genuine sharing of health
care  and  the  “alloparental”  care  for  children,  food,  warmth,  etc.  is  performed  by
treating another human as part of the same situation or relation one finds oneself in.
For this to happen no reciprocity of actions, gifts, shared intentionality or comparison
of the value of what is to be shared for humans to interact is necessary. In such an
economy  of  sharing,  the  equality  of  positions  of  each  interacting  human  is  an
existential one: to everybody existing at some time of his or her life by being related to
others, the same equal moral status and relational position is allocated.
54 In  contrast,  in  every  variety  of  market-economy  as  well  as  in  economies  of  gift-
exchange the equality of value of the exchanged goods or actions is assumed in each
economic interaction;  ensuring value equality,  accounting for reciprocal  equality of
value, in every economic transaction, is indispensible. This reciprocity of market and
gift exchange is possible only by comparing and thereby understanding and reducing
humans, as Marx pointed out, in their relation to each other to their contributions in
terms of some standard of value, e.g. money. This requirement excludes the possibility
that food is given to someone just because he or she “is around”: relational equality,
existential sharing and conscience are ruled out. These economic exchanges therefore
not only exclude but even destroy relations of sharing one’s life with each other.29 If it
is  only  the  equivalence  of  economic  value  that  counts,  the  mere  fact  that  humans
recognize each other as being human, and that they share the time and place of their
life,  is  completely  irrelevant  in  economic  terms,  regardless  of  how  poor,  hungry,
needful one or the other human being is. That is to say, it is impossible in a market
economy for economic interactions to take place by true sharing.30 If  there still  are
some close human relations based on sharing sympathy, friendship or empathy, the
introduction of reciprocal value to them by putting a price on them tends to destroy
these sharing-based relations.31 
55 In contrast, for existential sharing to obtain between people, grasping the presence of
another  person  as  a  human  being  is  sufficient  to  allow  for  acts  of  “Lebensteilung”
involving  both  parties.  Because  existential  sharing  implies  that  human  beings
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experience and address each other such that one is included by the other as this person
who  is  here  in  this  place  now –  e.g.  drinking,  eating,  dancing.  Widlok  points  out:
“Instead of the obligations to give, to receive and to return, the ethnography of sharing
suggests a pattern of opportunities to ask, to respond and to renounce.” (2017: xvii).
56 In sum, a basic feature of a way of life that allows for a democratic human culture and
economy are non-reciprocal techniques that rely on present relations between persons,
objects and resources. This is to say, being in relation to one another is part of the
human  predicament,  of  what  determines  that  homo  sapiens  sapiens  remain  human
beings  capable  of  living  their  lives  together  and  engaging  in  moral  and  political
processes that take care of the life and purposes of the humans involved. Democracy
becomes real if, in a community on the person-to-person level as well as on the level of
group or society, social and political interactions are based on and neither destroy nor
exclude ways of existentially sharing life. Because if sharing is the practice which, by
giving equal “sympathetic” weight to all human beings related interactively in a society
or community, it will allow selecting purposes in political and social processes in a way
that respects and intagrates everyone involved.
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NOTES
1. Numbers prefixed by “MS” refer to the microfilm edition of the manuscripts of C.S. Peirce as
listed in Robins (1967).
2. This is Cheryl J. Misak’s approach in Misak (2004a) and in Misak (2004b).
3. In his  1893 Monist-paper “Evolutionary Love,” EP 1:  352-71.  “EP” refers to one of  the two
volumes of Peirce (1998).
4. In rejoinder to Carus’s criticism, Peirce opts for a “social theory of reality” to be explained in
terms of a “socialistic” or “agapastic” ontology (6.610) – The decimal notation, e.g. 6.610, refers
to the sixth volume and the 610th section in Peirce (1931-1958).
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5. Originally  published in:  The  Open  Court,  No. 260  (Vol.  VI,  39),  1892,  S.  3399-3402;  cited  in:
[https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/bycsp/dmesis/mesis.htm].
6. “[…]  there should be something like  personal  consciousness  in  bodies  of  men who are  in
intimate and intensely sympathetic communion. It is true that when the generalization of feeling
has been carried so far as to include all within a person, a stopping-place, in a certain sense, has
been attained; and further generalization will have a less lively character. But we must not think
it will cease. Esprit de corps, national sentiment, sympathy, are no mere metaphors. None of us
can fully realize what the minds of corporations are, any more than one of my brain cells can
know what the whole brain is thinking.” (6.271, 1892).
7. Cf.: “Common sense, which is the resultant of the traditional experience of mankind, witnesses
unequivocally that the heart is more than the head, and is in fact everything in our highest
concerns, thus agreeing with my unproved logical theorem; and those persons who think that
sentiment has no part in common sense forget that the dicta of common sense are objective
facts, not the way some dyspeptic may feel, but what the healthy, natural, normal democracy
thinks.” (1.654, 1898).
8. In  1902  he  defines  rhetoric  as  the  discipline  that  studies  “the  general  conditions  of  the
reference of Symbols and other Signs to the Interpretants which they aim to determine” (2.93).
9. Ahti Pietarinen lists 24 pairs of concepts describing the dialogical positions, including “the
utterer-the interpreter,” “the assertor-the critic,” “the ego-the non-ego” and “the interlocutor-
the receiver” (Pietarinen 2006: 77-8).
10. The sequential combination of tokens (Peirce: replicas) used constitutes the content which
the assertion conveys. For example, in uttering the sentence “Socrates is wise,” “[…] it is not the
two signs ‘Socrates’ and ‘wise’ that are connected, but the replicas of them used in the sentence.
We do not say that ‘---- is wise’ as a general sign, is connected specially with Socrates but only
that it is so as here used.” (Peirce 1976: 346; MS 517, 1904, 34).
11. “Our speech gets its meaning by our other actions.” (Translated by H. Pape).
12. “I  term those occasions  or  objects  which are  denoted by the indices  the subjects  of  the
assertion.” (2.338).
13. This is Peirce’s thesis that the icon-index connection is a semiotic device for information
acquisition not restricted to language. How widespread this is and how many physiological and
cultural forms such “natural proposition” may have is shown by Stjernfelt (2014).
14. “The real world cannot be distinguished from a fictitious world by any description. […] It is
true that no language (as far as I know) has any particular form of speech so show that the real
world is spoken of. But that is not necessary, since tones and looks are sufficient to show when
the speaker is in earnest. These tones and looks act upon the listener, and cause him to attend to
realities. They are, therefore, the indices of the real word.” (2.337).
15. “When a listener hears the term ‘light,’ he proceeds to create in his mind an image thereof,
and goes through the very same process of thought which is attributed to the Elohim in the first
chapter of the Genesis. ‘And God said, Let there be light; and there was light. And God saw the
light, that it was good,’ – that is, that the light was, in fact, what was intended to be created. It
amounted to saying ‘that is light’! Until this process is performed, the name excites no meaning
in the mind of the listener.” (2.341).
16. “The  ancient  definition  of  an  enthymeme  was  ‘a  rhetorical  argumentation,’  and  this  is
generally  set  down as  a  second meaning of  the word.  But  it  comes to  the same thing.  By a
rhetorical  argumentation  was  meant  one  not  depending  upon  logical  necessity,  but  upon
common knowledge as defining a sphere of possibility. Such an argument is rendered logical by
adding as a premise that which it assumes as a leading principle.” (2.449, Fn1).
17. In a number of books and papers M. Tomasello from 1999 onwards leading up to Becoming
Human: A Theory of Ontogeny, 2019, building e.g. in Why We Cooperate, 2009, on experimental results
with apes and young children of his own research group, explained cooperation, human morality
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and culture, in terms of cognitive and interactive ability emerging from social relations. The
sociobiologist  E.O. Wilson  in  The  Social  Conquest  of  Earth,  2012,  and  in  The  Meaning  of  Human
Existence, 2014, even argued that the evolutionary success of humans depends only on the ability
to  use  social  relations  for  their  individual  needs  and interests.  Wilson’s  thesis  builds  among
others on the results of the anthropologist Sarah Blatter Hrdy’s work who showed in Mother
Nature: Maternal Instincts and How They Shape the Human Species, 1999, and in Mothers and Others: The
Evolutionary Origins of Mutual Understanding, 2009. Hrdy showed that cooperative rearing enables
humans cognitively to understand and use close relations to other humans, making all sorts of
social and moral cooperative actions available for their way of life. In a strangely restricted way
the success of human social relations is used in Y.N. Harari’s Sapiens. A Brief History of Humankind,
2014:  the secret of the victory of homo sapiens over all  other primate species,  including the
Homo neanderthalensis,  is  according to  Harari,  the  use  of  fictions  to  organize  social  groups
larger than 150 individuals.
18. This is the thesis of S. Blatter Hrdy’s “Cooperative Breeding Hypothesis” in Mother Nature
(1999): Humans’ social and emotional competence is developed fully only if not only mother and
father but other people are sharing their life with a child, acting as “alloparents,” as Blatter Hrdy
calls it.
19. Marten develops his approach to practical and anthropological issues in a number of books
and papers, in particular in Der menschliche Mensch: Abschied vom utopischen Denken, 1988, and in
his book Lebenskunst, 1993.
20. Marten’s claim that intentions and social agency presuppose and can be explained in terms of
sharing one’s life corresponds to a psychological theory developed by Prinz (2012).
21. Only events count as logical individuals. In MS 478 he argues that Philipp drunk and Philipp
sober are states of the same individual person only because this acts as a law for sequences of
events, controlling and unifying them. Cf. G. Riley (1974). Cf. also 3.93.
22. Cf. 7.21-48, first published in 1884 in “Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences,” 3 part 1,
73-83.
23. “We  can  admit  no  statement  concerning  what  passes  within  us  except  as  a  hypothesis
necessary to explain what takes place in what we commonly call the external world.” (5.266).
24. Cf. Tomasello (2009).
25. I  discuss the function of self-control in Peirce’s approach both to ethics and reasoning in
detail in de Waal & Skowronski (2012).
26. Peirce’s account of self-control provides us with a strategic model for the process of decision-
making. Because it describes a fallible and open-ended way of addressing the question of whether
my belief in an argument is well founded. I have to begin self-critical reasoning by looking at all
the reasons that induced me to accept an argument. However, although “reasoning is essentially
thought under self-control” (1.606) and all  development of  thought is  dialogical  (4.551),  self-
control can “never be perfectly thorough. For the last act of criticism is always itself open to
further inquiry.” (M 831, p. 12).
27. This life-sharing approach to politics is outlined in Marten (1994).
28. In his latest book Anthropology and the Economy of Sharing, 2017.
29. Indeed, as Widlok notes, this is what has happened time and again when sharing economies
made contact with market economies.
30. What are sometimes seen as examples of  a sharing economy, Uber and AirBnB, are only
varieties of market economy.
31. Research on economic  behavior,  such as  the  experiments  of  Dan Ariely  described in  his
Predictably  Irrational,  2008,  have shown that  market  exchange and human relations  based on
equal sharing not only exclude each other but that the first tends to destroy the later, if e.g. a
price is introduced for acts of sharing.
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ABSTRACTS
In this paper I argue that a strong concept of sharing – a close interactive relation that pre-
consciously allows humans to grasp themselves and each other as human – is crucial for the
human form of life.  This concept of sharing is  used to reconstruct some of Peirce’s insights.
Sharing is no part of Peirce’s account of person, morality and interpersonal relations. But his
rhetorical analysis of assertion as close, indexical interaction shows that sharing is necessary in
semiotics  and pragmatism.  The concept of  sharing is  used to reconstruct  his  metaphysics  of
evolutionary agape love and sympathetic relations as a selection principle of commonly pursued
purposes. Finally, sharing is shown to have economic meaning: the form of life in which humans
may satisfy their needs may consist in sharing directly the necessities of life with each other. If
humans live together and develop projects and purposes with one another because they share
with one another what is here and now, democracy is needed: as the only form of government
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